How can the jurists’ saying that the basic principle in acts of worship is devotion (ta‘abbud) and not to consider their meanings be reconciled with the fact that the majority mention apparent reasons (ilal) for most acts of worship and their details? Is the point of reconciliation that what the scholars intend is merely to prevent the application of analogy (qiyas) to them, while still holding that their meanings are intelligible? And is what I have concluded regarding the example of wudu’ (ablution)—of affirming wisdom while preventing analogy—correct?

Among the Sharia rulings, some have known 'illah (effective cause) and some do not. 'Illah-based reasoning is frequent in customs and transactions but rare in acts of worship, because the principle for the latter is the absence of such reasoning. However, if some acts of worship are given an 'illah, then analogical deduction (Qiyas) becomes permissible in them.

The 'illah is that to which a ruling is tied (e.g., intoxication is the 'illah for the prohibition of wine). As for hikmah (wisdom), it is the benefit derived from linking the ruling to its 'illah, such as the attainment of benefits or the warding off of harms (e.g., preserving the intellect is the hikmah behind the prohibition of wine).

Consequently, hikmah is not suitable for 'illah-based reasoning and cannot be relied upon for Qiyas, unlike 'illah. Many acts of worship do not have a specific, apparent hikmah, and the principle for acts of worship is devotion ('ibadah). That for which the 'illah is not known does not permit Qiyas.